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Abstract. In this paper, we will provide an overview of the current state-of-the-
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1 Introduction 
Side-channel attacks [1], which focus on physical implementations of cryptosystems 
and the potential flaws arising from them rather than cryptographic weaknesses, are a 
well-known study subject within the field of computer security. One such side-
channel attack is the so-called cold boot attack (CBA) [2], which first came to wide-
spread public attention in 2008 [3]. In short, cold boot attacks rely on the fact that 
Random Access Memory (RAM) exhibits so-called data remanence[4]. This means 
that, even though both Dynamic and Static RAM are volatile (in the sense that data 
will be lost eventually upon power removal) memory types, residual digital infor-
mation stored on such memory is present for some time even after power has been 
removed. This property enables an attacker to potentially recover information (such as 
cryptographic keys, passwords, etc.) that compromises system security. A CBA ex-
ploits this property by initiating a so-called cold boot, where power to the target ma-
chine is cycled off and on again (without allowing the operating system to properly 
exit and thus potentially erase or overwrite sensitive memory contents) after insertion 
of a bootable disk containing specialized software to immediately dump raw pre-boot 
memory contents. Subsequent analysis against the dumped memory is then performed 
to recover data of interest to the attacker. With certain types of memory, the attack 
time window can be extended by cooling them. Of course, it goes without saying that 
execution of a CBA requires physical access to the target machine on part of the at-
tacker. 
 
2 Cold Boot Attacks in-depth 
An especially interesting target for CBAs are so-called Full-Disk Encryption (FDE) 
systems [5]. FDE systems protect sensitive information on storage media by fully 
encrypting all information present on them, sometimes including the bootable operat-
ing system partitions. Benefits of such an approach include the fact that everything on 
a storage medium, including swap space and temporary files (which potentially con-
tain sensitive data), is encrypted as opposed to only those files considered sensitive by 
the user. In addition, FDE offers the user the option of immediate effective data de-
struction (though secure wiping or physical destruction is advised when considering 
potential future attacks) through the destruction of the cryptographic keys used to 
encrypt the storage medium.  
 
As society continues to increasingly rely on information technology, the amount of 
digitized sensitive information as well as the potential impact of its loss increases 
accordingly. Major cases of loss and theft of storage media containing sensitive in-
formation have spurred on the adoption of FDE systems [6] such as Truecrypt or Bit-
Locker [7,8]. As such, attackers seeking to obtain access to sensitive information (for 
espionage, criminal or law enforcement purposes) face an increasingly difficult task. 
 
FDE systems, however, have the tendency to store sensitive information (such as 
cryptographic keys or information from which these can be derived) in-memory dur-
ing runtime for user convenience and speed purposes. As such, an attacker with phys-
ical access to a running (but potentially locked) or suspended FDE protected system 
could perform a CBA to extract this sensitive information from memory and hence 
bypass the protection offered by FDE systems. Such a scenario poses a particular 
threat to users of mobile systems (such as laptops, netbooks, smartphones, etc.)  left 
unattended in a locked or suspended state or those who are targeted by law enforce-
ment raids while their systems are running. Needless to say, not only FDE systems are 
targeted with CBAs as target systems potentially hold more sensitive information in-
memory, such as (online account) passwords or cryptographic keys to other applica-
tions. 
 
The basic CBA scenario is roughly as follows: 
 
1. Take necessary steps (such as cooling the memory and taking countermeas-
ures into account) to get a suitable attack time window and attack conditions 
2. Obtain an image of the residual memory contents 
3. Identify and reconstruct sensitive information from the obtained memory im-
age 
 
We will discuss these steps in the following sections, beginning with the data rem-
nance phenomenon underlying CBAs. 
2.1 Decay and remnance 
Given the intended targets of CBAs, we will mostly concern ourselves with DRAM, 
which is a type of memory [9] where each bit of data is stored in a separate capacitor 
that is either charged or discharged (representing the two binary values each cell can 
take). As time passes, the capacitors will slowly discharge and decay to their ground 
state (which is either zero or one, depending on the capacitor’s wiring). Because of 
this decay, cells must be periodically refreshed (ie. memory contents are read and re-
written so cells hold their value) according to a certain refresh rate (which is usually 
within the order of milliseconds). 
 
However, as mentioned in Section 1, contrary to (what used to be) popular belief, 
DRAMs do not immediately lose their state if they aren’t regularly refreshed. In fact, 
most DRAM modules retain their state largely in-tact (without refresh, without power 
and even when removed from a motherboard) for periods of up to thousands of re-
fresh intervals [10]. Halderman et al.[3] observed that at normal operating tempera-
tures (varying from 25.5°C to 44.1°C) DRAM saw a generally low rate of bit corrup-
tion for a period of several seconds, followed by a period of very rapid decay, with 
newer memory technologies tending to decay faster. In general, despite the fact that 
these decay patterns varied between models, they are highly non-uniform and both the 
ground states to and the order in which various different cells decayed almost invaria-
bly proved very predictable. 
 
It has been widely documented that memory operating at lower temperatures displays 
significantly higher retention times [11,12], thus aiding attackers in increasing their 
attack time window. Using simple cooling techniques such as spraying from an up-
side-down container of canned air (so that it dispenses its contents in liquid form and 
not as a gas), an attacker can obtain surface temperatures of -50°C. This ensures that 
less than 1% of the memory contents are decayed, even after a period of 10 minutes 
without power. Subsequent tests showed that submerging DRAM modules in liquid 
nitrogen to obtain surface temperatures of ~ -196°C meant a decay of only 0.17% of 
the memory contents after a period of 60 minutes without power, suggesting removed 
DRAM modules stored with proper cooling may be susceptible to reliable recovery 
after periods of multiple hours or even days. 
 
In addition to decay, attackers seeking to perform a CBA are faced with the fact that 
upon booting the system the BIOS often overwrites parts of the memory, though this 
is usually only a small fraction (in the order of a couple of megabytes) of the memory 
often located at the lowest part of the address space. Another problem arises from the 
fact that some system BIOS perform a so-called Power-On Self Test (POST) [13] 
which overwrites large sections (or sometimes all) of the memory. Fortunately for an 
attacker, this test can usually be bypassed by setting certain BIOS options. A final 
problem comes in the form of systems supporting so-called Error-Checking & Correc-
tion (ECC) memory where the BIOS sets memory to a known state (thus effectively 
erasing its previous contents) to avoid errors from occurring upon reading uninitial-
ized data, a feature that cannot be overridden. Attackers seeking to perform a CBA on 
such a system would have to transfer the ECC memory modules in question to a non-
ECC system, potentially benefiting from ECC’s increased error-resistance. 
2.2 Image acquisition 
In order to obtain an image of residual memory contents an attacker doesn’t need any 
special equipment. One problem, however, is that upon system boot, the memory 
controller initiates DRAM refreshing and hence reads and rewrites each bit, fixing 
their values and halting decay. Since (as discussed in section 2.1) booting a system 
will invariably overwrite some parts of memory, an attacker should seek to limit this 
by booting from a small, special-purpose operating system which dumps memory 
contents to an external storage medium after (either warm or cold) boot. The imaging 
tools presented by Halderman et al. [3] (booting from PXE, USB Drive, EFI or iPod) 
provide such functionality, using only a small amount of RAM and being located at 
memory offsets chosen so that data structures of potential interest remain unaffected 
and saving the memory dump to the medium from which they were booted. 
 
Depending on counter-measures put in place (see section 4) and the attacker’s access 
to the target system, the aforementioned imaging tools could be utilized in either of 
the following scenarios [3], presented in order of ascending sophistication and re-
sistance to counter-measures: 
 
1. Warm boot: This scenario involves a simple warm boot, using the OS’ re-
start functionality which, though preventing decay, gives any running soft-
ware the opportunity to perform a memory wipe before shutting down. 
 
2. Cold boot: This scenario (the CBA proper) involves briefly interrupting and 
restoring power or using the system restart switch so that only little to no de-
cay (depending on the particular memory’s properties) takes place while 
avoiding giving any running software the opportunity to perform a memory 
wipe. 
 
3. Transferring memory modules: Even if the previous two scenario’s (such 
as due to counter-measures erasing memory contents upon boot) are infeasi-
ble, an attacker could still physically replace the memory modules of the tar-
get system and dump an image of their contents using another, attacker-
controlled, system. Though such an approach exposes memory modules to 
greater decay than the previous scenarios, section 2.1 shows that an attacker 
could cool down the memory module before shutting off power in order to 
extend their attack time window (even up to several minutes) and limit de-
cay. One additional benefit of this approach is that an attacker could place a 
removed primary memory module as a secondary memory module on their 
target machine and thus map the contents to a different section of the address 
space, preserving memory contents otherwise overwritten during booting. 
2.3 Key reconstruction 
Despite the fact that memory contents can be recovered using a CBA with relatively 
few errors even a small amount of errors can complicate the extraction of crypto-
graphic keys significantly. As such, research into CBAs has included optimizing 
methods for correcting errors in cryptographic keys for both symmetric and asymmet-
ric algorithms (we will use the AES and RSA cases as illustrative examples). The 
most naïve approach (which quickly becomes infeasible even under conditions of 
minor decay) would be a bruteforce search over the set of keys with low hamming 
distance from the extracted (decayed) key. More sophisticated reconstruction algo-
rithms use the fact that most encryption solutions (see section 3) store either pre-
computed key schedules [14] or extended forms of the key in-memory. A key sched-
ule is a set of keys derived from the master key, each of which is used in the separate 
cipher rounds. In order to enhance performance (as part of an efficiency-security 
trade-off), key schedules are often pre-computed and stored in memory (at least as 
long as the encrypted volume is mounted). Since the round keys are derived from the 
master key through the cipher’s scheduling operations, the key schedule can be seen 
as an error-correcting code [15] and the key reconstruction problem is essentially a 
coding-theoretical decoding problem. Using such an approach, keys can be recon-
structed far more efficiently under conditions of far worse decay. An additional bene-
fit of such methods is that keys can be recovered without having to test decrypted 
ciphertext against the resulting plaintext, using data derived from the key as an indica-
tion of the likelihood of its correctness. 
 
It is noted [3] that in most cases memory bits tend to decay to a predictable ground 
state, with only a minority flipping in the reverse direction. Under the assumption that 
an attacker has no knowledge of decay patterns except for the ground state, decay can 
be modelled as a binary asymmetric channel for various levels of decay described by 
probability δ0 (the chance of a 1 flipping to a 0) and some fixed probability δ1 (the 
chance of a 0 flipping to a 1). As time passes and decay progresses, δ0 will approach 1 
while δ1 remains fairly constant (usually under 0.1%). Ground state decay probability 
δ0 can be approximated from the acquired memory data through the fraction of 1s and 
0s (since cryptographic key data is assumed to be uniformly distributed). This yields 
two possible scenarios, that of perfect asymmetric decay (where δ1 = 0) and that of 
imperfect asymmetric decay (where δ1 > 0, usually between 0.05% and 0.1%). Under 
conditions of perfect asymmetric decay all 1s present in the recovered key schedule 
can be presumed correct with certainty, while this does not hold for those under con-
ditions of imperfect asymmetric decay. Of the various key reconstruction approaches 
some can only handle conditions of perfect asymmetric decay, while others can han-
dle both scenarios (though with significant performance penalties in the latter case). 
2.3.1 AES 
The Rijndael cipher, selected as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [18] in 
2001, is present in a wide range of cryptographic solutions (often as the default op-
tion). AES (128-bit) key expansion consists of 11 round keys of 4 words (128-bits) 
each, the first round key being the master key itself. Every remaining key schedule 
word is the product of either a) a XOR operation between two key schedule words or 
b) the key schedule core operation performed on a key schedule word with the result 
XORed with another key schedule word. Over time, various approaches to AES key 
reconstruction have been suggested: 
1. Algorithmic: Instead of trying to correct entire keys at once, the AES key recon-
struction method proposed by [3] works on smaller sets of bytes one at a time, 
something that is possible because of the linearity of the AES key schedule. This 
way an optimal decoding can be bruteforced for small enough sequences that are 
still large enough for the decodings to be useful to overall key reconstruction. After 
obtaining a list (ordered by likelihood) of possible decodings for those smaller key 
segments these can be combined into the full key to be checked against the key 
schedule. The running time of the algorithm is limited by the number of combina-
tions to be checked and while this is still more or less exponential in the number of 
errors, it is a significant improvement over bruteforcing. It is noted that if δ0 or δ1 is 
sufficiently small it is highly likely a unique solution will be found as well as that 
the algorithm is capable of reconstructing half of keys with 30% decayed data 
within 30 seconds. 
 
Tsow [19] proposed an improved AES key reconstruction method capable of re-
covering almost all keys with 70% decayed data in less than 20 minutes. The in-
creased speed of the method allows an attacker to enumerate all keys satisfying de-
cay and key schedule constraints (and hence determine whether a found solution is 
unique or not) within reasonable time (rather than halt on the first match) for decay 
rates up to 60%. The method proposed by Tsow, which is a recursive branch-and-
bound [20] depth-first tree search, works by building up an (initially empty) recov-
ered key schedule by guessing an additional byte b in every recursive call, subse-
quently computing all bytes that can be derived from the bytes established so far. If 
this recovered key schedule still satisfies the error model constraints, the recursive 
functions descends further down this tree-branch. Otherwise (or upon not finding a 
valid key schedule after the full branch has been investigated) the next value for b 
is tried. The order in which byte positions are guessed is optimized (using path pri-
oritization with a set of heuristics) to maximize the number of implied schedule 
bytes and thus minimize the number of compatible candidates at every stage. 
Riebler et al. [21] expanded upon the work by Tsow by translating the latter’s 
method to a state machine (with optimized datapaths for faster processing of the 
most commonly accessed tree levels) and implementing it with an FPGA [22], 
supporting both perfect and imperfect asymmetric decay models. Riebler et al. 
provided a software implementation outperforming that of Tsow by 3 times and a 
hardware implementation outperforming Tsow’s software implementation by 6 
times under perfect asymmetric decay and by 27 times under imperfect asymmetric 
decay, making AES key reconstruction under conditions of high, imperfect asym-
metric decay feasible.   
2. Max-PoSSo: Further improvements in AES key reconstruction (with applications 
to Serpent and Twofish as well) have been made through solving polynomial sys-
tems with noise based on mixed integer programming [23]. Albrecht et al. [24] 
note that the key reconstruction situation (the recovery of the original key from a 
set of decayed round keys) can be cast as a system where every bit of every round 
key corresponds to a Boolean polynomial equation with the origin key bits as vari-
ables with additional noise stemming from decay. The problem of key reconstruc-
tion is thus cast as a so-called Partial Weighted Max-PoSSo (Polynomial system 
solving) problem, which is then converted into mixed integer programming prob-
lems (since these deal with minimizing or maximizing functions in several varia-
bles under constraints of linear (in)equality and partial integrality) solved using the 
SCIP (Solving Constraint Integer Problems) solver [25]. While it is noted Max-
PoSSo problems are analogous to so-called Max-SAT (boolean satisfiability) prob-
lems (see below), the former better preserve the algebraic structure of the problem. 
The method employed by [24] (which can be applied if perfect asymmetry cannot 
be assured, ie. if δ1 ≠ 0) achieves a maximum success rate of 70% under conditions 
of 15% decay (taking 11.77 seconds on average) and worst-case non-zero success 
rates for up to 50% decay (taking 3074.36 seconds on average). Huang et al. [27] 
presented additional improvements in solving polynomial systems with noise by 
using a so-called Incremental Solving and Backtracing Search (ISBS) method. 
ISBS tries to incrementally solve a noisy polynomial system in increasing order of 
hamming weight, using the Characteristic Set (CS) method [27] to improve overall 
efficiency. The ISBS method achieves a maximum success rate of 75% under con-
ditions of 15% decay (taking 0.07 seconds on average) and worst-case non-zero 
success rates for up to 50% decay (taking 772.02 seconds on average), with a min-
imum success rate of 23% compared to the 8% of [24]. 
 
3. SAT-Solving: Kamal et al. [28] observed that the relations between the AES key 
schedule round keys can be easily cast as a Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) problem 
[29], which consists of checking whether there exists an assignment of Boolean 
values to the variables within a Boolean formula such that the formula yields true. 
Although SAT-solving is NP-complete, many real life SAT problems can be effec-
tively solved using heuristics, as is done by so-called SAT solvers. SAT solvers 
have many applications in cryptography [30] and as such Kamal et al. were able to 
use CryptoMiniSAT [31] to recover 128-bit AES keys under conditions of 70% 
decay with a worst case of less than 3.5 minutes and average and median recovery 
times of 1.2 and 0.36 seconds, with promising results for up to 74% decay. Liao et 
al. [32] presented improvements in using SAT-solving techniques for AES key re-
construction purposes by taking into account the situation of imperfect asymmetric 
decay (ie. δ1 ≠ 0) explicitly not treated by Kamal et al. This was done by using a 
Max-SAT solver which considers the key bit relations as hard constraints and the 
charged state bits as soft constraints (accounting for a δ1 > 0), attempting to satisfy 
all hard constraints and maximizing the amount of satisfied soft constraints (as op-
posed to regular SAT solving which seeks to satisfy all constraints and merely re-
ports the problem as unsatisfiable if this is not possible). In addition, the Max-SAT 
approach outperformed the regular SAT approach as well, being capable of recon-
structing AES keys under conditions of 76% decay (and for δ1 = 0.1%) within 300 
seconds on average and doing so almost 4 times faster than the regular SAT ap-
proach. 
2.3.2 RSA 
RSA [33] is one of the most widely used public-key cryptosystems in the world and 
features in many cryptographic solutions. An RSA key pair consists of a public key 
(comprised of modulus N and public exponent e) and a private key (comprised of 
private exponent d and redundant optional values such as N’s prime factors p and q, d 
mod (p-1), d mod (q-1) and q-1 mod p). These optional values are stored in order to 
increase computation speed. When reconstructing RSA key material from decayed 
memory an attacker has no key schedule to rely on (as is the case for DES, AES, etc.) 
but is effectively faced with a partial key exposure scenario, with bits of the secret 
key and optional values being available with some probability of error. As noted by 
Halderman et al. [3] there have been various proposed approaches [34,35,36,37] to 
effectively reconstruct partially exposed RSA private keys, most of which are based 
on Coppersmith’s [35] approach which involves finding solutions to a system of pol-
ynomial equations using so-called lattice basis reduction [38] given a known contigu-
ous fraction of (least- or most significant) key bits. Since decayed key material ac-
quired with a CBA might have errors distributed across all bits of key data (as op-
posed to the most- or least significant bits only), [3] proposed a method different from 
previously published work. Given public modulus N and p' and q' recovered from 
memory, the original p and q can be reconstructed iteratively from the least signifi-
cant bits. Under conditions of perfect asymmetric decay with probability δ, the ith bits 
of p and q are uniquely determined by the ith bit of N and the attacker’s guesses for 
the i-1 least significant bits of p and q (except when p'i and q'i are both in ground 
state) yielding a branching process of degree 
(3+δ)2
8
. Under conditions of imperfect 
asymmetric decay, the estimated probabilities can be used to weight the branches at 
each given bit guess. For 2048-bit keys, the algorithm achieved median reconstruction 
times of 4.5 seconds where δ = 4% and 2.5 minutes where δ = 6%, while for 1024-bit 
keys it achieved a median reconstruction time of 1 minute where δ = 10%. For higher 
error rates, it is proposed to reconstruct only the first 
𝐧
𝟒
 bits using this technique and 
use the techniques described in [34,35,36,37] to efficiently reconstruct the full key. 
 
Since the publication of the paper by Halderman et al. [3] several papers (the full 
contents of which are outside the scope of this paper) seeking to tackle the problem of 
RSA key reconstruction under conditions of partial key exposure with a focus on 
CBAs have been published [39,40,41,42,43,44], mostly relying on binary-tree-search 
and pruning-based techniques. However not all of the proposed methods are equally 
well-applicable to CBA scenarios as Halderman et al. [3] observe that in a realistic 
CBA scenario the asymmetric decay is likely to be imperfect. Kunihiro et al. [42] 
describe two effects introducing noise in to-be-reconstructed key material: erasures 
(bits equal to the decay ground state that can as such not be known to be in tact or 
decayed, denoted as δ) and errors (bits flipping in the opposite direction, denoted as 
ε). Most methods for RSA key reconstruction, however, consider only one of two 
cases (eg. only erasures or only errors) and are incapable of dealing with keys (called 
noisy secret keys by Kunihiro et al.) suffering from both. Paterson et al. [44] add to 
this the observation that methods relying on the assumption that a given fraction (con-
sisting of a mixture of 0s and 1s) of the RSA private key is known [34,35,36,37,39] 
with certainty, are hindered by the fact that, in a CBA scenario (even under unrealistic 
conditions of perfect asymmetric decay), only either all 0s or all 1s are known with 
certainty. In addition, methods relying on the assumption of (near) symmetric decay 
(ie. δ0 = δ1) [40,41] overlook the fact that in a CBA scenario δ1 will virtually always 
be relatively small while δ0 will virtually always be several times larger than δ1, as 
such rendering methods built upon symmetric decay assumptions unreliable in real-
world CBA scenarios. To our knowledge, only the works [42,43,44] are capable of 
properly and efficiently dealing with realistic CBA scenarios. 
 
Kunihiro et al. [42] present a polynomial time algorithm, by combining and optimiz-
ing the methods of Heninger et al. [39] and Henecka et al. [40], for noisy secret key 
reconstruction using noise model 0 ≤ ε < 
𝟏
𝟐
, 0 ≤ δ < 1 and 0 ≤ ε + δ < 1. The proposed 
algorithm can handle special cases (ie. the perfect asymmetric decay and symmetric 
decay assumed by [39] and [40] respectively) achieving the upper bounds of its com-
posite algorithms in these cases and outperforming them in general. The method can 
reconstruct 1024-bit AES keys in polynomial time provided that 1 − δ − 2ε ≥
√
2(1−δ)𝑙𝑛(2)
m
 (where m is the number of secret parameters (eg. p, q, d, etc.) involved), 
with success probability over 91% and running time below 2.24 seconds for δ0 up to 
0.6 and δ1 up to 0.01. 
 
Paterson et al. [44] recast the previous work on RSA key reconstruction under condi-
tions of partial key exposure as a coding theoretical problem, designing a method 
capable of dealing with a realistic (ie. imperfect asymmetric decay) CBA scenario. 
The proposed algorithm is a modification of the one proposed by [39] but uses the 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) [45] statistic instead of the Hamming metric for candi-
date selection. At each stage the algorithm selects L of the candidates (generated us-
ing Hensel lifting [46] on the maintained list) with the highest ML value to be passed 
as the list to the next stage (with the initial list being constructed from the recovered 
decayed key material), testing the final list of candidates with encryption and decryp-
tion to obtain a single private key candidate. In addition to the proposed algorithm, 
Paterson et al. also propose a method to derive upper bounds (in terms of δ0) on the 
performance of algorithms used for noisy RSA key reconstruction. The proposed 
method matches or outperforms those of [39,40] (in the applicable cases) and is capa-
ble of achieving non-zero success probabilities for δ0 as high as 0.61 (the theoretical 
upper bound upon which is 0.658) given δ1 = 0.001. Success probabilities of at least 
66% are achieved for δ0 up to 0.5, with running times always below 42.732 seconds. 
In addition, when private keys of the forms (p, q, d) and (p, q) are concerned (under 
identical δ1), the method achieves non-zero success probabilities for δ0 up to 0.43 and 
0.26 respectively (with theoretical upper bounds 0.479 and 0.298 respectively). For 
these cases success probabilities of at least 55% and 68% are achieved for δ0 up to 
0.35 and 0.15 with running times always below 108.523 and 9.492 seconds, respec-
tively. 
 
In contrast with search tree- [39] or lattice-based [35] approaches, Patsakis [43] pro-
poses the use of SAT solvers for the purpose of RSA key reconstruction. The problem 
is cast as a Boolean satisfiability problem linking the bits of the private to the public 
RSA key, filling in the bits known through partial key exposure. While performing 
not as efficiently as the aforementioned approaches, this method is capable of recon-
structing 1024-bit RSA keys within 40 seconds with only 38% known bits of p, q and 
d. It is further noted that implementation improvements as well as further research in 
the usage of SAT solvers for RSA key reconstruction would probably yield even bet-
ter results. 
In addition to the above approaches showing the feasibility of RSA key reconstruction 
in a realistic CBA scenario, it is noted that the approaches of [42] and [44] can be 
adapted to first reconstruct either the RSA key’s Least- or Most Significant Bytes 
before passing on the result to methods optimized for dealing with reconstructing 
keys given such partial exposure (but which are generally incapable of dealing with 
realistic CBA scenarios) such as [34,35,36,37,39]. 
2.4 Key identification 
In order to obtain (and reconstruct) encryption keys from dumped memory images, an 
attacker has to be able to locate them first. The problem of identifying cryptographic 
key information from acquired memory images has featured prominently in the field 
of digital forensics for quite some time, as outlined by [47,48], and has seen many 
different approaches over the years: 
 
1. Brute-force: A straightforward, if naïve, approach involves testing every 
possible byte sequence as a potential key in a linear fashion [49] or using the 
memory image as a dictionary [50]. Despite being easily generalizable such 
approaches only work properly when cryptographic keys are stored directly 
and contiguously in memory. In addition they quickly become infeasible for 
large memory images and require an accurate, error-free memory image. 
 
2. Mathematical properties: Techniques seeking to identify cryptographic keys 
on the basis of their mathematical properties (such as the relation between 
known public keys and the searched-for private key in the case of RSA or 
their high entropy) have been proposed by Shamir et al. [51]. Such methods 
have the benefit of not requiring the in-memory presence of any special for-
mat or key schedule but are susceptible to a fairly high number of false posi-
tives [3], especially in the context of decayed memory images as well as be-
ing generally inapplicable to symmetric keys [50]. 
 
3. Identifying encoding formats: Such approaches, as proposed by [3,52,53], 
avoid searching for the key material directly and instead seek to identify 
them by meta-data related to their encoding formats, such as finding RSA 
keys by looking for ASN.1 prefixes [54] of the DER-encoded [55] private 
keys [60]. The methods of [52,53], however, have been noted to be quite 
prone to false positives [3] and generally inapplicable to symmetric keys [50] 
and as such [3] proposes to either search for known fields of the ASN.1 ob-
ject (such as the public modulus) or look for the DER encoded RSA version 
number (instead of RSA Object Identifiers) and the subsequent DER encod-
ing of the next field a few bytes further. 
 
4. Identifying data structures: These techniques, such as those proposed by Pet-
tersson [10] and Walters et al. [56], seek to identify keys by their container 
data structures. The method in [10] involves testing memory locations for 
their plausibility of holding key data based on the likely values for surround-
ing variables. It is noted [3], however, that this method requires an attacker 
to manually derive search heuristics for each encryption application as well 
as not being very robust in the face of memory errors. 
 
5. Identifying key schedules: [3] proposed a fully automated technique for locat-
ing encryption keys in memory images regardless of the presence of errors. 
The proposed technique identifies the key schedule instead of the master key 
itself and searches for the schedule by looking for memory blocks which 
(almost) satisfy its combinatorial properties, allowing an attacker to recover 
partial key schedules (such as those overwritten during memory reallocation) 
as well as avoiding having to reverse-engineer the encryption software in or-
der to identify the particular data structures used. [59] significantly improves 
upon the work of [3]  by implementing the proposed AES key identification 
method as an FPGA, outperforming a software implementation from 10 up 
to 75 times when tested against real memory contents and from 25 up to 205 
times when tested against synthetic random data, depending on the chosen 
error thresholds (since the approach of [3] discards candidates exceeding a 
given threshold) and the number of parallel FPGA kernels. 
 
6. Combined approach: [48] proposed an approach combining several of the 
aforementioned methods, implemented in the proof-of-concept tool Interro-
gate [57] capable of searching for RSA, AES (128-, 192- or 256-bit), Serpent 
[61] and Twofish [62] (256-bit) keys. An additional contribution of [48] is 
proposing a technique to reconstruct process virtual address space from the 
acquired memory image using the so-called Page Directory Base (PDB) [58], 
which significantly improves search time (in the face of keys distributed 
non-contagiously throughout memory due to paging). 
3 Practical applicability 
In this section, we will present a brief overview of the results of various research ef-
forts into the practical applicability of CBAs against a variety of systems and crypto-
graphic solutions. While some works [48] have addressed several different crypto-
graphic software classes (such as Full Disk Encryption and Virtual Disk Encryption), 
for brevity’s sake we will only summarize the results of experiments against systems 
offering FDE (and optionally VDE) functionality. 
3.1 PCs 
The primary target of most CBAs will be various types of PCs, especially portable 
ones such as laptops or netbooks. As noted by [48], an attacker performing a CBA can 
be faced with a machine in a large number of different system states (which are re-
duced to 8 ‘archetypical’ states in the paper). It was found that [48], generally speak-
ing, all tested FDE systems were fully vulnerable (ie. recovery with 100% success 
rates) in the live, screensaver and logged out states, less vulnerable (with 29% success 
rate) in reboot state and not vulnerable in boot state. They also found VDE key man-
agement routines regarding hibernation-based dismounting to be inadequate, allowing 
for recovery rates of up to 44% from the hibernation file. Furthermore, it is noted that 
successful identification and reconstruction of cryptographic key material is depend-
ent upon the system state at attack time with CBAs against live, screensaver and 
logged out system states being highly successful and turned off devices yielding far 
worse results. The authors thus conclude that target system state at the moment of 
acquisition and successful identification of cryptographic systems and hardware in 
use by the target are vital to CBA success. Provided that these conditions are met, the 
chances of a successful CBA attack are considered sufficiently high by the authors to 
consider it a valuable and realistically applicable digital forensic tool. 
 
The experiments conducted by [64] against a variety of system configurations (with 
memory sizes ranging from 256MB to 24GB) running an instance of TrueCrypt con-
figured for VDE purposes yielded some contradictory results with [3]. It was noted 
that not all memory modules tested exhibit signs of data remnance and that those 
which do sometimes wouldn’t when used in certain computer systems, possibly ow-
ing to the role motherboard residual capacitance plays in the maintenance of electrical 
charges of the memory module cells. Since there is no available exhaustive listing 
detailing data remnance properties for various memory modules and their combina-
tion with various motherboards, this underlines the importance of target system 
knowledge by an attacker pointed out by [48]. As such [64] recomms CBAs only as a 
last resort digital forensic tool, favoring more forensically sound and reliable tech-
niques (such as DMA attacks [65]) instead. 
 
Gruhn et al. [66] verified the claims made by [3] against a variety of memory mod-
ules. The conducted tests confirmed the practicality of CBAs against DDR1 and 
DDR2 memory modules under a variety of setups even though deviations with re-
gards to temperatures and error rates were found. In addition, the correlation between 
memory module temperatures and data remnance was confirmed empirically as well 
as confirming that a CBA involving transferring (significantly cooled) memory mod-
ules between target and attacker systems (see section 2.2) was feasible in practice 
with an error rate low enough (between 1 and 5%) to allow for efficient key recon-
struction and the additional benefit (for an attacker) of bypassing all software-based 
countermeasures. A new result, however, was the finding that modern DDR3 memory 
modules (not covered in [3]) do not exhibit data remnance under cold boot conditions 
(even though a warm boot attack scenario, which could be prevented with a BIOS 
boot lock, did prove successful), regardless of temperature, possibly owing to either 
the combination of lower voltages, higher integration density and hence lower RAM 
cell charges or specifics related to DDR3 memory controllers. If the later proves to be 
the case, the authors argue, it is possible that an attacker machine with modified 
DDR3 controllers could allow for CBAs against such memory modules. 
 
Thus we can conclude that, while advice regarding their forensic reliability varies, 
CBAs are a practically feasible class of attacks (for a wide range of memory modules 
and system setups) with a high success rate (given adequate pre-existing attacker 
knowledge of the target system) and as such pose both a privacy and security risk and 
an opportunity for practitioners of digital forensics. 
3.2 Smartphones 
With the proliferation of smartphones and the increasingly diffused nature of sensitive 
data storage [67], smartphones present an interesting target to all kinds of attackers 
(criminal and forensic investigator alike) seeking to tap into the wealth of information 
held by these devices. Müller et al. [68] documented the feasibility of CBAs against 
ARM-based portable devices such as Android smartphones. With the release of 
Google’s Android 4.0 operating system in 2011, smartphone users were able to use 
FDE to protect the contents of the data in their user partitions. Android 4.0’s FDE 
solution (which is disabled by default) is based on dm-crypt [69] and encrypts user 
partitions mounted at /data (instead of the whole disk) using AES in dm-crypt’s aes-
cbc-essiv:sha256 mode using 128-bit keys. Data is encrypted using a primary ‘Data 
Encryption Key’ (DEK) which is subsequently encrypted using a secondary ‘Key 
Encryption Key’ (KEK) derived from a user-defined PIN or password in order to 
avoid necessary re-encryption of all data in case the latter are changed. The user-
defined PIN or password in question is the one used for so-called screenlock [70] 
functionality and as such Android’s encryption functionality is not available when 
screen locking mechanisms such as patternlocks (which can be easily bypassed with 
so-called smudge attacks [71]) or facial recognition (which can be easily bypass by 
holding up a picture of the owner) are used. PINs are comprised of 4 to 16 numeric 
characters while passwords are comprised of 4 to 16 alphanumeric characters with at 
least one letter, with 4-digit PINs being the most widely used screenlock protection in 
use (even as 57% of all smartphones aren’t protected by any security mechanism at 
all). 
 Müller et al. [68] presented a tool called FROST (developed on the basis of a CBA 
against Galaxy Nexus smartphones specifically, but generalizable to other models) to 
perform CBAs against Android smartphones with encrypted user partitions. FROST 
follows the general CBA procedure outlined in section 2, with the difference lying 
mainly in the acquisition of the RAM memory dump. Since smartphones cannot be 
booted from USB or other external media, as is the case for PCs, the existence of the 
recovery partition (comparable with a rescue system for regular PCs as it allows basic 
operations without fully booting into Android) is abused to flash the prepared FROST 
image onto. It is observed that there are generally two scenarios that an attacker can 
encounter: 
 
1. Unlocked bootloader: On devices with an unlocked bootloader, FROST is 
capable of cryptographic key recovery from RAM or PIN-bruteforcing and 
immediate subsequent on-phone user partition decryption using the obtained 
key. FROST offers two key search modes: quick and full, with the former be-
ing optimized for Galaxy Nexus devices and only scanning for AES keys 
within a certain address range (doing so within seconds, though with a lower 
success rate on other devices) and the latter searching the entire address 
space using a sliding window mechanism looking at every physical memory 
page twice (in order to account for AES keys possibly being split over multi-
ple memory pages), doing so in between roughly 3 and 8 minutes. It is fur-
ther noted that 4-digit PINs can be cracked within at most ~3 minutes and 
that extension to up to 7-digit PINs would be feasible (taking about 25 
hours). 
 
2. Locked bootloader: Unfortunately for an attacker, bootloader unlocking gen-
erally (with a few models as exceptions) wipes userdata and cache partitions 
which renders cryptographic key recovery pointless (as the encrypted data is 
gone) though still possible. However, it is noted that there is a relatively 
large amount of Galaxy Nexus devices (and other smartphones as well) with 
unlocked bootloaders. In addition, it is still possible for an attacker to recov-
er a wealth of sensitive information from the memory of smartphones with 
locked bootloaders using a CBA such as personal photos, visited websites, e-
mail and instant messaging logs, contact lists, calendar entries and WLAN 
credentials. 
 
Before performing a CBA against the target smartphone, an attacker has to ensure the 
device has enough power because after power loss the only option left is PIN-
bruteforcing. After ensuring adequate power, the device has to be cooled down (put-
ting the phone in a water-condensation resistant bag for a period of 60 minutes in a -
15°C freezer was found to be sufficient) to increase the attack time window (since an 
error rate of 50% was already noted at temperatures of only 25°C, while only 5% was 
observed at temperatures of 10°C). Assuming the bootloader is unlocked, the CBA 
itself is then performed by removing and quickly re-inserting the phone battery while 
holding the power button before removal, so as to ensure quick booting upon battery 
re-insertion. Now that the risk of memory decay is averted, so-called Fastboot mode 
is entered, the FROST image is flashed onto the phone from a connected PC and the 
phone is booted into the recovery mode which now contains the FROST image. 
4 Counter-measures 
Below we will discuss a variety of counter-measures, both software- and hardware-
based, that have been proposed to mitigate memory-acquisition attacks in general and 
CBAs in particular with various degrees of effectiveness. 
4.1 Software-based 
1. Scrubbing memory [3]: A primary countermeasure would be avoiding the 
storage of cryptographic key material in memory whenever possible and 
erase it as soon as it is no longer being used. Software ought to (securely) 
overwrite key material when it is no longer needed and prevent its paging to 
the disk and boot procedures ought to perform wiping of any remnant data as 
well. However, this does not apply to keys that need to be in use such as 
those used by mounted encrypted disks and an attacker could still perform a 
memory module transference-based CBA [66]. An example of the use of 
memory scrubbing mitigation is DEADBOLT [72], which seeks to achieve 
protection against CBAs for Android smartphones by (upon screenlock) un-
mounting the encrypted userdata partition and securely overwriting the key 
stored in RAM as well as possible sensitive plaintext information. 
 
2. Limiting boot options [3]: Many CBA scenarios involve booting a system 
from removable media or other non-standard booting options. Limiting the 
allowed boot options (eg. to disk-only) and setting an administrative pass-
word offers some protection, though an attacker might still be able to swap 
out the system’s drive for a custom one, reset flash memory to re-enable 
non-standard booting or simply transfer memory modules [66]. 
 
3. Safe system suspension [3]: System suspension (eg. entering ‘sleep’ mode) 
has been shown to be vulnerable to CBAs, even if the system enters screen-
lock mode upon wake (since the attacker could simply cold boot the machine 
after waking). Similarly, system suspension to the disk (eg. entering ‘hiber-
nation’ mode) is also vulnerable unless an externally-contained secret is re-
quired for system resumption. An effective countermeasure would be simply 
powering off the machine and guarding it for a couple of minutes until 
memory contents are properly decayed before leaving. However, this is quite 
inconvenient for end-users (who are hence less likely to adopt it) and as such 
safe system suspension might be better achieved by requiring an external se-
cret (such as a password) for wakeup and memory encryption (see section 
4.2) using a key derived from this secret. 
 
4. Avoiding pre-computation [3]: As discussed in sections 2.3 and 2.4, precom-
putation makes key identification and reconstruction far easier. So while pre-
computation might increase performance, avoiding it altogether or making 
compromises in the form of time-limited caching of precomputed values re-
duces vulnerability to successful CBAs. 
 
5. Temperature detection [66]: The usage of temperature sensors [73] has been 
proposed as a way to complicate, but not fully prevent, CBAs. As many 
modern motherboards have temperature sensors built-in for heat control (in-
cluding for the RAM zone), software could erase memory contents upon de-
tecting a sudden temperature drop within the RAM zone. Since sensors are 
infused into the motherboard, the risk of tampering is mitigated. However, 
an attacker is still able to power up an attacker-controlled system B without 
RAM (which, though left in a failure state, keeps refreshing any inserted 
memory module) and rapidly remove the desired memory module from tar-
get system A (without using cooling) and inserting it in B, leaving the at-
tacker with a regular CBA scenario on system B. Since no cooling is used, 
the CBA on B is performed under conditions of more serious decay though 
test results have shown that 90 to 99% of memory contents could be recov-
ered correctly (though its proneness to mishaps means that scenarios with re-
covery of only 73% of memory contents can occur as well). 
 
6. Boot block defense [66]: Another proposed countermeasure  aimed at x86 ar-
chitecture machines is the so-called 0x7c00 (or boot block) method. On x86 
machines 0x7c00 is the memory address to which the BIOS loads the Master 
Boot Record (MBR). Cryptographic key material could then be placed in this 
512-byte sized memory region such that any reboot will automatically over-
write it. However, an attacker could still transplant the target memory mod-
ule to a system with two memory slots where slot covering the 0x7c00 
memory region is filled with a dummy memory module while the slot cover-
ing the upper address space holds the target memory module. 
 
7. CPU-bound cryptography: Given that RAM is the acquisition target of 
CBAs and other memory-based side-channel attacks (such as DMA attacks), 
one proposed category of solutions consists of kernel modifications which 
store sensitive cryptographic key material securely outside RAM in such a 
way that they aren’t easily accessed by applications running with regular 
privileges and are lost as soon as the computer restarts. There exist various 
proposals for such an approach: 
 
i. Symmetric: TRESOR [74] is a Linux kernel patch implementing AES 
and the associated key management purely within the CPU, avoiding 
storing sensitive information in RAM. To this end, it uses the CPU de-
bug registers [75] to store the keys, as the contents of these registers are 
irrecoverably lost upon any power-off. In addition, TRESOR uses Intel’s 
AES-NI [76] instruction extensions (implementing most of AES in 
hardware) in order to optimize code length and performance so that it 
matches (and in some cases even outperforms) the performance of AES 
implementations using RAM. AES-NI instruction operands are always 
SSE [77] registers and as such cryptographic state and key information 
passed to these instructions is fully CPU-bound during execution as well 
as during passive storage. Since CPU registers are often swapped to 
RAM (due to user space scheduling), a naïve CPU-bound AES imple-
mentation might still have sensitive information end up in memory. In 
order to mitigate this, TRESOR disables interrupts (eg. it is run atomi-
cally) while cryptographic operations are being performed as well as 
blocking access to the debug registers by non-ring 0 processes. The only 
time sensitive material enters RAM is for a brief period when a system 
users enters their password during startup right before it is transferred to 
the debug registers, after which the associated memory is securely 
wiped. Since key schedules cannot be kept in-memory (due to security 
reasons) nor in CPU registers (due to lack of space), TRESOR re-
computes round keys on-the-fly for each input block (which is processed 
within an atomic section where round keys can be safely stored in the 
SSE registers). Luckily, the performance drawbacks of round key re-
computation are mitigated by the usage of specialized AES-NI instruc-
tions. As a secure side-effect of its implementation, TRESOR compli-
cates (if not mitigates) AES key reconstruction due to its elimination of 
persistent key schedule storage and complicates DMA attacks by elimi-
nating sensitive material from memory. It is noted, however, that it is 
theoretically possible to read out CPU registers on a running machine 
using an oscilloscope by measurement of the electromagnetic field 
around the CPU, even though there seem to be no such successfully 
documented attacks. With TreVisor [78], TRESOR’s encryption capabil-
ities were added to BitVisor [79], a light-weight hypervisor implement-
ing a variety of security features (such as FDE and protection against 
certain DMA attacks). This way TRESOR is made OS-independent by 
moving it from the operating system to an underlying hypervisor, thus 
offering protection against CBAs regardless of operating system. Final-
ly, TRESOR can be considered the conceptual father to ARMORED 
[80], which is a dm-crypt module that offers CPU-bound encryption for 
ARM-based Android smartphone devices in order to mitigate (among 
other things) CBAs against them. 
 
Loop-Amnesia [81] is a Linux kernel patch for CPU-bound AES encryp-
tion (based on Loop-AES [82]) conceptually similar to TRESOR with 
the primary differences being Loop-Amnesia’s usage of Machine Spe-
cific Registers (MSRs) [83] for key storage, its (as of yet) lack for AES-
NI support, limitation to 128-bit keys only and support for multiple disk 
encryption keys (as opposed to TRESOR’s limitation to a single key and 
hence a single encrypted disk) by storing them securely in RAM after 
encrypting them with the primary, CPU-bound master key, thus offering 
multiple encrypted disks (allowing mitigations against watermarking at-
tacks as offered by Loop-AES) at the cost of worse performance and 
lower overall key length. 
 
However, as [84] has shown, an attacker capable of performing a DMA 
attack is able to bypass CPU-bound encryption solutions. The OS-
independent attack is based on the observation that solutions like 
TRESOR make the assumption that while ring 3 processes are to be shut 
off from access to cryptographic keys, ring 0 processes are not and that 
the latter will not leak key material to RAM as well as the fact that DMA 
attacks can read as well as write to memory. The attack itself has an at-
tacker gain physical access to the target system, attach a device to a 
DMA-bus (eg. FireWire) and recover physical memory contents for sub-
sequent analysis. The attack devices injects a payload into target 
memory at the adequate locations such that it executes within ring 0. The 
payload (now running in the kernel) then proceeds to copy the CPU-
bound encryption key from the registers it is kept in to a given location 
in RAM for subsequent DMA-based extraction by the device. The au-
thors note that the attack, which was confirmed to be effective against 
TRESOR and suspected to be effective against Loop-Amnesia as well, 
could be mitigated through a variety of measures such as disabling 
DMA, DMA device whitelisting, Hardware-based FDE (see section 4.2) 
or the usage of an IOMMU [86]. 
 
ii. Asymmetric: PRIME [87] is a Linux kernel patch that extends the notion 
of CPU-bound encryption to support RSA and hence closes the gap for 
asymmetric CPU-bound encryption support. It does this by symmetrical-
ly encrypting all private RSA parameters for the supported 2048-bit keys 
with AES (using the AES-NI instructions) before storing them in RAM 
and decrypting them only within CPU registers as well as implementing 
RSA’s modular exponentiation fully on the CPU (using an optimized 
version of Montgomery reduction [88]) such that no state information is 
leaked to RAM. PRIME only supports private RSA operations (as public 
RSA operations are non-critical with regards to the posed problem) and 
has a performance drawback of being roughly 10 times slower than 
regular RSA implementations. As a secure side-effect of its implementa-
tion PRIME complicates potential RSA key reconstruction by not encod-
ing its private keys in the fashion described in section 2.4. COPKER 
[89] is a Linux kernel patch for CPU-bound private RSA operations sim-
ilar to PRIME with the difference of having a larger cache-size and thus 
support for longer private keys and more efficient algorithms (eg. RSA 
with Chinese Remainder Theorem [90]). 
 
8. Leakage-resilient cryptography [3]: The problem of designing cryptosystems 
resilient to partial key exposure (which is effectively the basis of key recon-
struction efforts from memory images acquired through CBA) extends be-
yond CBAs [91,92,93] and the exact specifics fall outside the scope of this 
paper. Certain proposals [91], however, have been proposed in a CBA con-
text [3]. The approach in [91] proposes to render a cryptographic key K, not 
currently in use but necessary at a later time, resilient to partial key exposure 
by storing it as K ⊕ H(R), where R is a b-bit sized buffer of random data 
and H a hash function (eg. SHA-256). Given a CBA scenario where d bits in 
the buffer are flipped (and assuming the use of a strong hash function) the at-
tacker has a search space of (
b
2
+𝑑
𝑑
) to determine which were flipped given 
that 
b
2
 bits could have decayed. If b is sufficiently large this will be infeasible 
even for relatively small d. For normal operations, when the key is required 
again recomputation given R is trivial and fast. Though interesting develop-
ments have been made in this field, it is noted [81] that the fact that CBA 
memory acquisition can yield images with error rates under 1% means that 
partial key exposure resilient cryptosystems by themselves aren’t sufficient 
as a protection measure as any definitive countermeasure has to be able to 
withstand the possibility of full key exposure to RAM. 
4.2 Hardware-based 
1. Memory encryption: The successful recovery of sensitive information from a 
memory dump acquired by an attacker could be mitigated by the usage of 
memory encryption (varying from One-Time-Pad schemes [94] to AES), 
where memory contents are encrypted upon writing to RAM and decrypted 
upon reading. Initially designed around questions regarding intellectual 
property theft and assurance of memory integrity, (full or partial) memory 
encryption can be roughly divided into three areas: hardware-based modifi-
cations, software-based modifications or specialized industrial applications. 
Of these, only the former two are applicable to CBA mitigations for general 
purpose computing devices. There are a variety of memory encryption ap-
proaches [95] and though there exist both proposed software- and hardware-
based memory encryption solutions, it has been noted that the most mature, 
efficient and secure proposals are hardware-based in nature. There are sever-
al reasons for this: First of all, the increased overhead associated with soft-
ware-based memory encryption solutions (largely resulting from them being 
implemented on top of the existing operating system) results in its lowered 
likelihood of widespread adoption. Additionally, in order to compensate for 
this overhead, many software-based memory encryption approaches employ 
a partial encryption model where a set of ‘secure components’ (such as cryp-
tographic application processes) is identified and only their associated 
memory regions are encrypted. Apart from the non-trivial nature of identify-
ing ‘secure components’, there is always the possibility of memory contents 
and sensitive information being exchanged with other, non-secure, compo-
nents which use unencrypted memory regions. Finally, software-based solu-
tions make a series of assumptions (eg. that the kernel is secure to begin 
with) that hardware-based solutions do not make. According to the authors 
of [95] the most secure memory encryption approach is Aegis [96] which in-
cludes both hardware and software components, integrity mechanisms, full 
memory encryption using AES and an FPGA-implemented prototype. In 
practice, however, there seems to be only one commercial product (Private-
Core’s vCage [97]) offering memory-encryption functionality with other 
proposals being academic works and their associated proof-of-concepts. To 
our knowledge, there exists no literature evaluating the practical effective-
ness of memory encryption technology against CBAs. 
 
2. Hardware-based FDE [98]: Hardware-based FDE (sometimes called self-
encrypting drives (SED)) performs cryptographic operations using special-
ized chips in the hard disk controller instead of using system CPU and RAM, 
thus eliminating memory as an attack vector (and hence mitigates CBAs). 
Generally speaking, this approach involves the usage of a write-only key reg-
ister internal to the disk controller to which software can write (but not read 
from) an encryption key, which is then used to encrypt data before writing it 
to the disk and decrypt data before reading it from the disk. As such, crypto-
graphic functionality is fully contained within the disk controller and the as-
sociated key isn’t stored in either RAM or the CPU, with the additional ben-
efit of having no performance degradation. A drawback, compared to soft-
ware-based FDE, is that the latter is usually cheaper, disk-vendor independ-
ent, more configurable and quickly and easily employable on existing system 
setups. However, it was found [99] that theoretically secure SEDs are often 
vulnerable to a variety of (new and adapted) attacks in practice. For example, 
SEDs do not detect whether their data connection is cut as long as power re-
mains on and hence only get locked when power is cut. Given a running sys-
tem with an unlocked SED, an attacker could thus perform a so-called hot-
plug attack by unplugging a target SED’s data connection (while ensuring 
power remains connected) and plug it back into its own machine and proceed 
to read out the still unlocked data. In addition it was found possible to reboot 
running systems with unlocked SEDs (since the SED doesn’t realize it is get-
ting rebooted as power to it remains on) into a different (live) operating sys-
tem which could then proceed to simply mount the unlocked disk. Both at-
tacks are trivial and far more reliable than regular CBAs, making most SEDs 
less secure than software-based FDE solutions. Security of this approach 
thus depends on at least ensuring that the key register is erased and the drive 
locked upon power loss or when it is attached to another system (even if no 
power loss occurs during the move). 
 3. Architectural changes [3]: Designing RAM which exhibits faster decay 
might be a solution to the CBA problem, though obviously there is the ten-
sion between faster decay and ensuring decay probability between refresh in-
tervals remains low. As discussed in section 3.1, DDR3 might be a candidate 
for such a solution though as of yet it remains to be determined whether the 
low remnance exhibited is intrinsic to DDR3’s design or related to its con-
trollers. 
 
4. Physical mitigations [3]: Physical protection of RAM modules (through 
locking them in place with soldering, encasing them in epoxy, etc.) might be 
a simple way to mitigate or at least complicate CBAs, at the cost of reducing 
system modification flexibility. 
5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the data remnance effects exhibited by many RAM memory modules 
are a viable and realistic attack vector for an attacker seeking to extract sensitive in-
formation contained in-memory (such as cryptographic keys to circumvent FDE sys-
tems) through CBA. The decay to which the acquired information is subject can be 
sufficiently minimized through physical cooling of the memory modules, so that a 
variety of approaches for the identification and reconstruction of cryptographic key 
material under conditions of decay can be feasibly executed within a realistic 
timeframe. CBAs have been shown to be practically applicable to both PCs and 
smartphones given that the attacker encounters these devices in a particular system 
state. However, the fact that certain memory modules (such as DDR3 RAM) exhibit 
no signs of data remnance (though it still has to be determined whether this is intrinsic 
to their design) and the lack of an exhaustive study of which memory modules in 
which system setup are susceptible and which aren’t, combined with the necessity for 
an attacker to determine the target system’s memory module type on forehand puts 
limitations on the applicability of CBAs to the field of digital forensics, as the possi-
bility of data-loss or corruption due to a botched CBA presents technical as well as 
judicial difficulties. In such cases, it is generally recommended other, less delicate, 
memory acquisition side-channel attacks (such as FireWire DMA attacks) are used 
instead when possible. From the variety of proposed counter-measures to CBAs, 
CPU-bound cryptography seems to be the most promising software-based solution, 
though hardware-based solutions seem more resilient in general (memory encryption 
in particular) even though very little robust solutions seem to be openly available and 
a solution presenting combined counter-measures protecting against the entirety of the 
memory-acquisition attacks spectrum (such as CBAs and DMAs) remains an open 
problem. 
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